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IN T·HE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
CHARLES YONK, 
Deceased. 
Appellant1s 
Briel 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This ·is an appeal by the administrator from a de-
cree of partial distribution by which the court decreed 
distribution of $26,000 on a per stirpes or representa-
tive basis, as prayed for by cross petitioners, and not 
equally on a per capita basis, as prayed for by the admin-
istrator. 
None of the facts is in dispute. The administrator, 
William F. Kidman filed his amended, verified petition 
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praying for partial distribution of the above estate on a 
per capita basis, to-wit: the sum of $1,083.33 to each 
of the 24 nieces and nephews of decedent. Some of the 
heirs, to-wit: Garland Y onk Alfred Y onk, Edith Nessen, 
Merlin J. Cowley, Norma C. Wilson and Hanna Bensen, 
through their attorney Newel G. Daines, filed their cross-
petition praying for distribution of said estate on a per 
stirpes or representative basis, to-wit: the sum of 
$5,200.00 to Garland W. Yonk, as the only child and heir 
of Henry Y onk, a predeceased brother of decedent; $2,-
600.00 each to Merlin J. Cowley and Norma C. Wilson, as 
the children of Elizabeth Yonk Cowley, a predeceased 
sister ot <lecedent; $1,733.33 to each of the three children 
of William F. Y onk, a predeceased brother of decedent ; 
the sum of $7 42.85. to each of the seven children of Fred 
C. Yonk, a predeceased brother of decedent; and the sum 
of $4 72.72 to each of the eleven children of Minnie Y onk 
Kidman, a predeceased sister -of decedent. 
It is alleged and admitted by all parties concerned 
that decedent Charles Yonk died interstate; that he was 
never married, and left no issue, father, mother, brother 
or sister, but left 24 nieces and nephews surviving him. 
It is also alleged and admitted that appellant is the duly 
appointed, qualified and acting administrator in said es-
state; that more than four months have elapsed since 
publication of notice to creditors. That all claims, fun-
eral expenses, etc., and some of the charges and expen-
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ses of probate have been paid; that the first annual ac-
count has been filed and approved by the court, and that 
it is for the best interest of all of the heirs that partial 
distribution of $26,000 be made at this time. That such 
distribution will still leave ample funds in the estate to 
pay the balance of all expenses, inheritance taxes, etc., 
when the same are determined. 
It is also admitted and alleged both by the adminis-
trator and the cross petitioners that decedent left sur-
viving him as his heirs at law 24 nieces and nephews, 
children of deceased brothers and sisters, as follows: 
One child of Henry A. Y onk, a predeceased brother 
of decedent. 
Two children of Elizabeth Yonk Cowley, a prede-
ecased sister of decedent. 
Three children of William F. Yonk, a predeceased 
brother of de~edent. 
Seven children of Fred C. Yonk, predeceased broth-
er of decedent. 
Eleven children of Minnie Y onk Kidman, a prede-
ceased sister of decedent. 
It will thus be seen that the heirs at law of dece-
dent are all in the same degree of kindred and consan-
guinity to the decedent, they are all next of kin, nieces 
and nephews, in equal degree of relationship to the de-
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cedent. 
The one question presented on this appeal relates to 
the amount of the estate to which each heir is entitled. 
Should distribution of this estate he made equally on a 
per capita basis, or should it be made on a per stirpes, 
representative, basis to the 24 nieces and nephews? 
ASSIGNMENT· OF ERROR 
Appellant assigns as error to the court below its 
decree of partial distribution distributing the estate on 
a representative basis rather than on a per capita basis, 
as prayed for by the administrator. 
Appellant contends that the heirs, being all in the 
same degree of kindred to decedent, are entitled to share 
said estate equally. That the court should have distri-
buted $1,083.33 to each of the said heirs. Under our 
present statute as it now stands there is no direct pro-
vision for the heirs herein under conditions and facts as 
here presented; but we submit that before the amend-
ment by the Code Commission in 1933, our succession 
statute was clear and definite, as to the rights of these 
heirs. The amendment _to Section 101-4-5 (6) has made 
·that statute indefinite, uncertain, ambiguous and has led 
to utmost confusion. 
Subsections ( 4) and (6) of Section. 101-4-5 of our 
statute are the principal sections involved in determin-
ing the rights of succession to the estate of decedent's 
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nieces and nephe\Ys herein. 
Respondents' council argued to the court below, and 
the court upheld, that distribution to the heirs in case at 
bar must now be made under subsection ( 4). We cite 
that as the first error to the court below. It is our con-
tention that subsection ( 4) does not apply and was not 
intended to apply unless brothers and sisters or some of 
them survive the decedent. Spbsection ( 4) states when 
brothers and sisters inherit. The premise or condition 
which allows subsection ( 4) to operate and ap~ly has eli-
minated all nearer relatives than brothers or sister:::;, 
and thus provides when brothers and sisters inher~t. 
The fact that subsection ( 4) also says "and to the chil-
dren or grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister 
by right of representation" does not do away with the 
necessity that a brother or sister must survive the dece-
dent in order for that subsection ( 4) to apply. 
We direct the court's attention to the earlier com-
pilations, this statute: Section 2828 Compiled Laws of 
Utah, 1907; and Section 6408, Compiled Laws of Utah> 
1917. T'ho~e earlier compilations contain sub-headings 
for each of the nine sub-paragraphs. While in Section 
101-4-5, 1933, these sub-headings have all been dropped, 
the numbering, wording and subject matter of each of 
the nine sub-sections is the same as in the earlier com-
pilations, and hence we submit the same meaning was 
and is clearly intended in each sub-division of the present 
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statute. 
Thus, subsection (1) of 101-4-5, in both the present 
and earlier compilations covers succession in the normal 
cases where there is suhviving husband or wife w"ith 
children or issue; subsection (2) covers the cases where 
there is issue, but no surviving husband or wife; subsec-
tion (3) "Surviving husband or wife, no issue, when 
father, etc., inherit"; subsection ( 4) "When brothers and 
sisters iJ?.herit all"; subsection (5) "when husband or 
wife inherits all"; subsection (6), "No immediate fam-
ily, next of kin inherit"; subsection (7) "Death of child 
under age, other children succeed" ; subsection ( 8) 
"Death of child under age, when issue of other chil-
dren succeed"; subsection (9) "When estate escheats to 
school fund." 
Thus by the ordinary process of elimination we sub-
mit that subsection ( 4) states a case when all closer 
relatives have been eliminated and when brothers and 
sisters inherit. In order to inherit they must be alive. 
The fact that said subsection ( 4) says if any (implying 
some but not all) are dead that their share goes by re-
presentation to the children or grandchildren (of the 
dead brother or sister), does not change the rule that 
some brothers or sisters must be alive in order for sub-
section ( 4) to apply. 
Our Section 101-4-5 ( 4) is identical with former 
provision of Section 1386 (3) Calif. Civil Code, and the 
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California Supreme Cou~t has interpreted that section 
and held that it does not apply unless brothers or sisters 
survive the intestate. 
In the ease,-Estate of Nigro, 156 P. 1019, the Cali-
fornia court held that Section 1386 (3), (our subsection 
101-4-5 ( 4)) applied only when a brother or sister sur-
vived the intestate. Again in a later case, In re Ross' 
Estate, 202 P. 641, where grand-nieces and grand-
nephews claimed to take under Section 1386 (3), our sub-
section ( 4), the California Supreme Court again reaf-
firmed the holding in the Nigro case that said section 
did not apply unless som2 brothers or sisters survived 
decedent. 
t_ 
Other courts have similarly interpreted· such· statu-
tory provisions. In Appeal of Hall 102 A. 977, (Maine), 
the statute provided that when intestate left no wife, is-
sue or parents, the estate goes to the brothers and sis-
ters and if any be dead by representation to the children 
of such brother or sister. The Main court held that that 
statute did not apply unless brothers or sisters survived 
the intestate. 
Counsel for contestants concede that such was the 
rule prior to 1933. In their written brief to the court 
below they stated : 
"Prior to 1933 we concede that the rule would 
have been otherwise. Under the act before amend-
ed by the legislature in 1933, the Court will note that 
collateral heirs after brothers and sisters were 
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treated as next of kin, (subsection 6), and that sub-
section ( 4) only applied where there was a surviving 
brother or sister." 
Then counsel proceeded to argue in their brief that 
by the amendment to subsection ( 6), adding the phrase, 
"nor children or grandchildren of any deceased brother 
or sister," that children and grandchildren of deceased 
brothers and sisters have been excluded from inheriting 
under sU.bsection (6) and therefore, without any statute 
to that effect, they must now be held to take under sub-
section ( 4), irrespective of whether or not any brothers 
or sisters survived the intestate. In their brief to tnt 
court below they stated : 
"As our legislature by its am~ndment in 1933, 
thus excluded the children or grandchildren of any 
deceased brother or sister of a decedent from in.-
heriting under the provisions of subsection 6, as 
next of kin, the only possible sub-section that they 
· can inherit under is sub-section 4 ... " 
We think counsel's conclusion (which apparently 
the lower court accepted) was erroneous and unsound, 
for (1) they have pres.ented no change or amendment to 
subsection (4) which would make that subsection apply 
now when it did not apply before 1933; and (2) no valid 
reason was shown or presented supporting the unjust 
conclusion that the heirs at law herein should now be 
held to be excluded under subsection (6), as next of kin, 
and therefore be excluded from taking equally under 
(6) now, as they admittedly did before the purported 
amendment. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
We submit both of these arguments, e. g. (1) that 
the heirs herein, all nieces and nephews, do not inherit 
equally under (6), but now take by representation under 
( 4), even though no brother or sister survived the de-
cedent; and (2), that these heirs have now been exclud-
ed from taking under (6) as next of kin, (as they admit-
tedly did take prior to 1933) were and are both errone-
ous, and led to the unjust and erroneous decree of distri-
bution herein appealed from. 
First it should be noted that the amendments or 
changes i~ subsections (4) and (6) were not __ made __ by 
the legislature, but were made by the Code Committee 
for the codification of our statutes. The only change 
made in ( 4) was as stated, to add the words "or grand-
children." We have no grandchildren of brothers or 
sisters involved in case at bar. We submit . the addi-
tion of the words "or grandchildren" in (4) did not 
change the operation and effect of ( 4) and did not indi-
cate, and cannot be construed to indicate an intent that 
(4) should now apply when it did not apply before, e. g. 
when no brother or sister survived the intestate. 
Where the provisions of a statute are carried 
forward and embodied in a section of a revision or 
codification, in the same words, or in words which 
are substantially the same and not different in 
meaning, the latter provision will be considered a 
continuance of the old law and not as a new and 
original enactment, and this is so both where there 
is an express declaration to that effect in the codi-. 
fication or revision, and in the absence of such de-
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claration; and the mere fact that acts are incorpora-
ted into a revision of the statutes, and the sections 
given new .numbers by the revisers, does not change 
the force or effect of the acts. Nor does a reenact-
ment of a chapter without the title change or en-
large the scope of the law in the absence of an in-
dicated intent to alter the scope of the enactment.-
59 c. J. 897. . 
It is therefore appellant's contention that the heirs 
herein, nieces and nephews of decedent, when no brother 
or sister survives, do not take under subsection ( 4) now, 
any more than they did prior to 1933. We have shown 
from the statute itself, from other court's interpreta-
tion of similar statutes, and from respondent's counsel's 
own admission, that (4) did not apply prior to 1933, 
when decedent left him surviving no brothers or sis-
ters.· Thus we think the court's first error was in its 
apparent holding that the heirs in case at bar now take 
under (4). 
2. We submit that the second error, was the lower 
court's apparent conclusion and ruling (as per counsel's 
argument) that the purported change or amendment to 
subsection (6) in 1933, excluded the heirs herein from 
inheriting or taking equally as next of kin under ( 6), as 
they admittedly did prior to 1933. And along with that 
conclusion, (excluding them from taking under ( 6) and 
in order not to disinherit such heirs, nieces and nephews, 
entirely-where no brothers or sisters survive the dece-
dent, hold, without any statute to that effect, that such 
heirs must now be held to take by representation under 
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(4) and not equally under (6) as they did prior to 1933; 
That subsection ( --1) must now be held to apply in such 
cases although admittedly that subsection did not apply 
prior to 1933. 
Prior to 1933, subsection (6), Sec. 6408 (6) Compiled 
Laws of Utah 1917, read as follows: 
If the decedent leave neither issue, husband, 
wife, father, mother, brother, nor sister, the estate 
must go to the next of kin in equal degree ... 
Section 101-4-5 (6) now reads: 
If the decedent leave neither issue, husband, 
wife, father, mother, brother, nor sister, nor chil-
dren or grandchildren of any deceased brother or 
sister, the estate must go to the next of kin in equal 
degree, ... 
It will thus be seen that the only change was to add the 
words "nor children or grandchildren of any deceased 
brother or sister" following the ·word "sister." What is 
the meaning and effect of (6) when ~thus · amended'! 
What \vas the purpose and intent of the change in (6)? 
Has that purpose been accomplished? 
In ascertaining the meaning of a code revision re-
sort may be had to reports of the code commissioners. 
. . 
50 AM. JUR. p 469, 59 C. J. 1102, section 651. In re-
ponse to our letter to the Secretary of State, as to what 
his records show by way of report by· the Code Commis-
sioners concerning changes in the statute (Section 101-
4-5) here considered, the Secretary states in his letter 
of August 17, 1948 as follows: 
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Upon check a copy of the report of the Code 
Committee for the proposed revision of the Utah 
Statutes, 1933, we quote the following concerning 
Section 101-4-5 referred to in your letter: "Sec-
tions 101-4-5 (3), ( 4), (5) ,- (6), have been changed 
to satisfy the recommendation of the Bar reader, 
following amendments made by the California Le-
gislature to meet an injustice resulting froiQ the 
decisions of its courts under a statute identical with 
ours. The effect accomplished is to keep succession 
in the direct line down through grandchildren." 
The "injustice resulting from the decision of the 
California courts'' referred to in the Code Committee's 
report were, without doubt, the Nigro case, supra, where 
decedent left no brothers or sisters, but left children and 
grandchildren of deceased brothers and sisters, and in Re 
Ross' Estate, supra, where decedent left no brothers or 
sisters, but left children, grandchildren, and great-
grandchildren of predeceased brothers and sisters. In 
both of which cases, as J.Ve have already noted, the Cali-
fornit Supreme Court held that the California Civil 
Code Section 1386 (3) (Utah Subsection (4) did not ap-
ply, when no brother or sisters survived the intestate. 
The California court further held in each of said cases 
that the estate passed under Section 1386 (5) (Utah 
subsection 6) to the next of kin equally and thus held, in 
each of said cases, that the- estate went to the nieces and 
nephews equally, as next of kin, to the exclusion of 
grandchildren and great-grandchildren of other prede-
ceased brothers and sisters. 
3. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that such 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
a result was an ''injustice", was it remedied by the 
amendment or changes made by the Code Committee 
in (4) or (6) in 1933? We think not. 
The above report of the Code Committee states, or 
at least strongly infers, that the changes made or pro-
posed in the Utah Statute were the-saine as the amend-
ments already made by the California Legislature, for 
they say, "following amendments made by the Califor-
nia Legislature." That was an easy phrase to throw in, 
which undoubtedly tended to lull our Legislature into 
acquiescence to the proposed change without a careful 
check. But that was not true. The i:hange made in 
the California statute is far different from the change 
in the Utah statute. The court wlil recall that prior to 
1933 the Utah statute, subsections (4) and (6) were 
identical with California Civil Code Sections 1386 (3) 
and {5) respectively. We have already noted that the 
only change made in the Utah statute, subsection ( 4), in 
1933, was to add the two words "or grandchildren'' in 
(4) following the word "children." Whereas, the same 
section in the California Civil Code, Section 1386 (3) was 
entirely rewritten, and is now known as Section 225, 
California Probate Code, and reads as follows: 
No surviving spouse nor issue. If the decedent 
leaves neither issue nor spouse, the estate goes to his 
parents in equal shares, or if either is dead to the 
survivor, or if both are dead in equal shares to his 
brothers and sisters and to the descendants of de-
ceased brothers and sisters by right of representa-
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tion. (Enacted 1931.) 
Thus Section 225, Cal. Probate Code, now grants or di-
rects," ... in equal shares to his brothers and sisters 
and to the descendants of deceased brothers and sisters 
by right of representation." Thus by the present Cali-
fornia statute, the grant under ( 4) is direct to the des-
<:endants of brothers or sisters of intestate, just as much 
as it is to brothers and sisters; it is not to the brothers 
and sisters of decedent and then, if any be dead, to the 
descendants of any deceased brother or sister by repre-
sentation. The condition precedent does not now apply 
to bring in the necessity of brothers or sisters surviving 
decedent in order for that section ( 4) to apply. Hence 
the court's prior construction of the earlier section, 
California 1386 (3), (Utah 4), (that said section does 
not apply unless brothers and/ or sisters survive dece-
dent) would, we think, not now be held to apply to sec-
tion 225 of the present California Probate Code. At 
least the California legislature has made a definite ef-
fort to avoid that prior interpretation of ( 4), which the 
Code Committee did not do. Likewise California Civil 
Code section 1386 (5), (Utah subsection 6), was amend-
ed to read as follows: 
If the decedent leaves neither issue, spouse, 
parent, brother, sister, nor descendant of a deceas-
ed brother or sister, the estate goes to the next of 
kin in equal degree ... (Enacted 1931.) 
Thus it is submitted that California has now quite clear-
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ly provided by amendments to ( 4) and (6) that descend-
ants of brothers and sisters, no matter how remote, take 
before next of kin, and such descendants are no longer 
classified as next of kin, but as collateral heirs, designa-
ted to take by representation. But the change made in 
the Utah state (4) & (6) is not similarly clear. We sub-
mit the change made in our state has caused confusion 
and uncertainty, as well as injustice. Did the change 
made by the Code Committee in (4) and (6) remedy the 
"injustice" mentioned by the Code qommittee, resulting 
from the California decisions ? We say "No." As we 
have noted in the California case, In re Ross' Estate, 
supra, nieces and nephews were permitted to take the 
entire estate as the next of kin, and grandnieces, grand-
nephews, great-grandnieces and great-grandnephews 
were excluded. This the Code Committee called "injus-
tice", but what rights are given to this third class-
great-grandnieces and great-grandnephews, under the 
amendments as made by the Code Committee, in 1933? 
The answer none! 
Did the Committee then remedy the "injustice" 
which they pointed to as their reason for the change? 
If we are now to change to a representative 
basis, we submit the "injustice" has not been reme-
died, but that is has been aggravated. The court, in the 
Ross case, excluded both grandnieces and great-grand-
nieces and gave the entire estate to the nieces and 
nephews equally as the next of kin. Under our statute, 
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as the Code Committee amended it, great-grandnieces 
and great-grandnephews are still excluded, even accept-
ing respondent's interpretation that (4) now automati-
cally applies. . If it is an "injus1tice" to give the estate 
equally to the next of kin, (after brothers and sisters) 
can it be justice to allow grandnieces and grandnephews 
to participate by representation and at the same time 
exclude great-grandnieces and great-grandnephews from 
taking by representation, when they represent another 
brother or sister of intestate? 
If the statute is not going to grant the estate 
equally to the next of kin, after brothers and sisters, as 
our statute clearly did prior to 1933, (and we think still 
does) , why, under the pretence of remedying an "inj us-
tice" and a particular decision of the court, provide 
that grandnephews may inherit but that great-grand-
nephews (from another brother or sister) are still to be 
excluded? Particularly when that was part of the "in-
justice" ruling in the case (Ross case) complained of? 
Again, suppose that the intestate had three prede-
ceased brothers, and that one had left children, the sec-
ond had left only grandchildren, and that the third had 
left only great-grandchildren. Under present. subsection 
( 4) and/or (6), as contestants must argue, the surviving 
grewt-grandchildren of the third predeceased brother 
would be excluded from any part of the inheritance, this 
because children and grandchildren of the first two pre-
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deceased brothers survived the intestate. The great-
grandchildren (representing the third brother) could not 
share under subsection ( 4) for, even if the court should 
now hold that ( 4) applies where no brothers or sisters 
survive, that subsection is limited to brothers ar d sisters, 
and their children and grandchildren. Thus the grand-
children of the second pre-deceased brother would share 
in the estate under the terms of subsection ( 4), if it is 
to be interpreted in accordance with the contention of 
contestants,.-(that (4) applies even though no brother 
or sister survives). They would take the representative 
share of the second brother, even though there were 
nieces and nephews, one degree closer to the intestate, 
who by the normal rules, and our construction of sub--
section (6), would be entitled to his estate. The chil-
dren of the first brother would, af course, be entitled to 
share in the estate, but only by right of representation, 
to 1/3rd of his estate. By statute, 101-4-23, they would 
now "Take the same share or right in the estate of an-
other person that their parents would have taken if liv-
ing." Thus the children_of the first brother would take 
1/3 of the estate; the grand-children of the second 
brother would take 1/3 of the estate; but the great-
grandchildren of the third brother would be excluded, 
even though they are representative stock of the third 
brother. Who would take the share which would have 
gone to the third brother had he been alive ? The court 
would be unable, under the statute as it now exists, to 
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distribute l/3 of the decedent's estate, and the same 
would probably escheat to the State. for no one of the 
heirs, would be entitled to claim it. If two brothers had 
left only great-grandchildren, then 2/3rds of the estate 
would escheat to the State, even though the intestate 
had left nieces and nephews from the first brother. 
4. It is at once apparent how unjust, ambiguous, 
uncertain and useless is the phrase "nor children or 
grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister inserted 
in subsection (6). It not only fails to remed·y the "in-
justice" noted by the Code Committee, but it aggravates 
that injustice, for while it grants (if this court rules 
that (4) automatically applies now) part of the estate 
by representation to grandnieces and grandnephews, at 
the expense of nieces and nephews, it at the same time 
denied inheritance by representation (or at all) to great-
grandnieces and great-grandnephews, and makes the 
share which would otherwise have gone to them by rep-
resentation, escheat to the State,-all at the expense of 
nieces and nephews who would otherwise inherit that 
part of the estate as next of kin, under the definite and 
clear provision of our statute prior to 1933. It is a well 
settled rule of construction that the courts will avoid a 
construction which disinherits heirs who would otherwise 
take, and cause part of the estate to escheat to the State. 
We think it is clear that all the Code Committee did 
was to insert the same phrase "chil~ren or grandchildren 
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of any deceased brother or sister" in subsection (3), ( 4), 
(5) and (6). They seemed to figure that settled every-
thing. But did it? Prior to the change, subsections (3) 
and ( 4) read: ~· ... and to the children of any deceased 
brother or sister by right of representation." In subsec-
tion (5) the wife inherited all, prior to 1933, if there 
were no brothers or sisters, but under (5), as amended 
by the Code Committee in 1933, the phrase "no children 
or grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister" "\vas 
inserted following the word "sister". Suppose decedent 
left no nieces or grandnieces, but left gre·at-grandnieces 
or great-grandnephews? Why are they arbitrarily ex-
cluded under ( 5) when representation is now brought in 
for the first time in that section? Is that justice? 
As we have stated in (4) the only change was to 
add "or grandchildren" following the word "children'' in 
( 4). So that the phrase now read~ "and to the children 
or grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister by 
right of representation." Now that whole phrase was 
lifted over, by the Code Committee, and instered in (6), 
except that it is prefixed by the neg~tive word "nor." 
5. It must be kept in mind that subsection (4) had 
been definitely construed and interpreted to aP.ply only 
if and when a brother or sister survived, and that the 
Code Committee had that in mind, for they refer to those 
very decisions, so construing ( 4). But they made no 
change in ( 4) which would make it apply irrespective of 
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whether or not a brother or sister survived, as did Cali-
fornia. We have pointed out that the small change in 
( 4) (adding "or grandchildren") would still leave the 
same interpretation of that section (4) where it had 
been fixed by the courts,-to apply only if a brother or 
sister survived. In other words the condition precedent 
in ( 4), for children or grandchildren to· inherit and take 
by representation, is that a brother or sister must survive 
the decedent. That condition precedent therefore still 
stands in (4). No change was made to overcome that 
interpretation of ( 4). 
It is a rule of construction of revised statutes and 
codes, that if a section thereof has been codified from a 
judicial decision, it is to be construed in the light from 
the source from which it was taken. 50 A.M. JUR. Pg. 
469. 
Then what was accomplished in (6) by inserting the 
negative phrase "nor children or grandchi~dren of any de~ 
ceased brother or sister? It will be noted that this 
negative phase in (6) throws t}lese people "children or 
grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister" into the 
large class of nearer relatives \vho are supposed in (6) 
to be alre~dy taken care of in the :r;rior subsections, and 
so ( 6) proceeds to grant succession, after them, to the 
next of kin. But the only sections which make it pos-
sible for them to take anything at all are sections (3), 
(4) and (5); and the only section which in any way ap-
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plies to case at bar is ( -1:). As we have seen, children 
and/or grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister, 
have been taken care of in ( 4), if a ·brother or sister sur-
vived the decedent, but not otherwise. 
How are these children or grandchildren taken care 
of if no brother or sister survived the decedent? Not by 
subsection ( 4), as it now stands; and not by ~ubsection 
(6), as it now stands, for that subsection expressly ex-
cludes them. There is no other section of our succession 
statute which takes care of nieces and nephews. T'here-
fore if that negative clause in (6) is given literal effect, 
nqt only confusion, but a hiatus has been created in our 
statute, so far as children and grandchildren of prede-
ceased brothers and sisters are concerned, where no 
brother or sister survives the decedent. Thus, instead 
of taking care of grandnieces and grandnephews, by ap-
parently allowing them to take by representation along 
with nieces and nephews_ subsection (6), as amended by 
the Code Committee, hJls in fact expressly excluded both, 
-·grandnieces and grandnephews, as well as nieces and 
nephews, when no brother or sister survives the intestate. 
So now, as the statute has been amended to read, literal-
ly, nieces and nephews can claim neither by representa-
tion, nor as next of kin, if no brother or sister survives 
the intestate. 
If the intent of the ~mendment was, as the Code 
Committee implies in its report, to keep succession in di-
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rect line down through grandchildren (but not to include 
all decendants of brothers and sisters), why didn't they 
either: (1), rewrite ( 4_), as did the California legislature, 
so as to overcome the interpretation given ( 4) by the 
courts and make ( 4) apply irrespective of whether a 
brother or sister survived, and grant succession directly 
nQ.t only to brothers and sisters but also to their children 
and grandchildren? Or, (2), make subsection (6) oper-
ate and apply as a direct grant of succession to children 
or grandchildren of deceased brothers and sisters, and 
not as an exclusion of them? Thus if (6) had been 
amended to read: "If decedent leave neither issue, wife, 
father, mother, brother nor sister, then the estate must 
go to the children and grandchildren of deceased brothers 
and sisters by right of represe:Qtation, and thereafter to 
the next of kin in equal degree." This would more 
nearly have accomplished their avowed purpose, though 
even so, such a wording would still be subj e~t to criti-
cism, because of the injustice to great-grandnephews, 
and also the possibility of escheat to the State in the case 
of surviving great-grandnieces and great-grandnephews, 
which we have set forth above. This injustice and pos-
. sibility of escheat to the State, was avoid_ed in California, 
where the amendment grants succe~sion direct to broth-
ers and sisters and to their descendants. 
The prior judicial construction of ( 4) becomes, we 
submit, of controling importance. In 50 AM. JUR. Pg. 
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312, s~. 321: 
"As an aid in the construction of a statute, it is 
to be assumed or presumed that the legislature was 
acquainted with and had in mind the judicial con-
struction of former statutes on the subject and that 
the statute was enacted with the light of judicial 
construction that the prior enactment had received.'' 
From this it follows that ( 4) must be given the 
meaning which the California Courts had given it,-that 
( 4) applies only if a brother or sister survives the in-
testate. 
It is apparent that the har reade:c and the code com-
mittee accepted the interpretation of ( 4) given by the 
California Supreme Court,. for they acknowledgeq that 
the amendments were made to do away with the "injus-
tice" of the interpretation given that section by the Cali-
fornia court. But instead of intelligently rewriting the 
statute so as to change the rule, (as did the California 
legislature) the Code Committee merely inserted the 
negative phrase "nor children or gr9-ndchildren of any 
deceased brother or sister" into (6) and thus created an 
ambuguity, and made (6) meaningless. For since the 
identical words were again used, they must be given the 
same interpretation by the courts. These words in ( 4) 
meant, and had been construed to mean, that children or 
grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister did not 
take by representation unless a brother or sister of the 
deceased survived. Now in (6) those words must be 
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held to mean the same thing: i. e. that next of kin in 
equal degree do not inherit equally, but take by repre! 
sentation, when and only when they are children or 
grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister and 
where there is a brother or sister surviving. 
The negative phrase "nor children or grandchildren 
of any deceased brother or sister" in ( 6) then , becomes 
ambiguous and meaningless, for by its terms (condition 
precedent) these heirs do not take under ( 6). Likewise 
they do not take under ( 4) unless a brother or sister 
survive. In view of the confusion a:-:d amtiguity of 
said phrase in (6), we submit it should be disregarded 
by the court and section ( 6) held to stand as it did prior 
to 1933, unamended. 
Contestants are furthermore faced with a dilemma. 
Either they must argue that ( 4) applies regardless of 
whether or not a brother or sister survives, which would 
be against the clear provisions of that statute prior to 
1933, against their own admission, and against repeated 
interpretations by various courts; and they must also 
then admit that there was no "injustice" which the Leg-
islature should attempt to remedy in 1933, in which case 
they would also have to admit that the change made to 
( 6) was meaningless, because the heirs would take under 
( 4) and not under (6) in any event. Or they must con-
fess, if they concede that said phrase in ( 4) only applied 
when a brother or sister survived, that the same phrase 
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likewise only applies in (6) today when a brother or sis-
ter survives, which is equally ambiguous and absurd 
for by its terms (6) does not apply if a brother or sister 
survives. We hope counsel '"ill clear up, if they can, the 
the confusion, ambiguity, uncertainty, injustice, and 
possibility of escheat, which is now packed into (6). 
6. We further point out that the change made in 
the statute in 1933 was a change by the qode Commis-
sion, and that a change so made is not entitled to the 
same weight as a legislative enactment, and will not be 
regarded as altering the law where the statute as revised 
is ambiguous. Duncan v. Idaho County (Idaho, 1926) 
245 P. 90, where the Idaho court said: ... 
"in the case of Libby v. Pelham, 166 P. 565, 30 Idaho 
this court said that changes made by a revision of a 
statute, as distinguished from legislative enactment, 
will not be regarded as altering the law, unless it is 
clear such was the intention; and, if the statute as re-
vised is ambiguou~, reference may be had to prior 
statutes." 
Conflict between original act and code or revi-
sion. Where there is a conflict between an ac"t as it 
was passed by the legislature and as it appears in 
a code or revision, the act as originally passed will 
control. 59 C. J. page 1102. 
7. We therefore respectfully submit that until the 
pres.ent uncertainty, ambigui~y, and possibility of es-
cheat in (6), is cleared up by the legislature, this court 
should disregard the negative phrase "nor children or 
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grandchildren of any deceased brother or sister," inser-
ted into (6) by the Code Committee. 
For the sake of argument, we may concede that the 
apparent purpose of inserting that negative phrase in 
(6), was to take nieces and nephews out of their former 
classification as next of kin, to whom our statute grants 
succession equally, on a per capita basis, and classify 
them as collateral heirs. But appellant contends that 
this is not enough. There must be a corresponding 
grant of succession of estate t9 them as such collateral 
heirs, otherwise there is a hiatus in the statute. Mere-
ly changing their classification is not sufficient. 
It is not enough to say that now that nieces and 
.nephews have been pushed out of (6) they must be deem-
ed to take under ( 4). For, as we have shown, ( 4) had 
been interpreted and construed to apply only when 
brothers or sisters survived, and ( 4) was not changed or 
amended so as to make it apply, irrespective whether or 
not brothers or sisters survived. Hence the heirs here-
in, who took under (6) equally, prior to 1933, cannot now 
be held to take by representation under ( 4). 
Again we say that said negative phrase in (6) should 
be disregarded and ignored because of its confusion and 
uncertainty, and the heirs herein should be held to take 
equally as next of kin under (6). 
8. This is in accordance with the general rule as to 
kindred of equal and unequal degree laid down in 26 C. 
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J.S. 1029: 
Except \vhere part of the members of that class 
are deceased, and taking by right of representation 
is permitted, kindred of the degree nearest to the 
intestate succeed to the estate, to the exclusion of 
those of more distant degrees; and, both by ex-
press statutory provision and otherwise, where the 
next of kin of the intestate who are entitled to share 
in the estate are in equal deg-ree to the deceased, 
they share equally in his estate. 
The Editors of C. J. S. here cite many cases, in-
cluding Kincaid v. Cronin, 22 N. E. 2d 576 (Ohio), where 
the Ohio court said: 
The rule of equality will be enforced in all cas-
es to the class of those in the nearest degree of con-
sanguinity to the intestate. 
and Johns v. Scobie, 86 P. 2d 820, 121 A. L. R. 1404, 
where the California court held that when the intestate's 
heirs were all nephe\vs and nieces they were all entitled 
to equal shares, under the la\v of succession, and there-
fore took title to the estate as tenants in common upon 
the death of the intestate . 
. Again in 26 C. J. S. 1029 the general rule as to rep-
resentation and taking. per stirpes or per capita is stated 
as follows: 
Where the persons entitled to the estate are in 
unequal degrees of consanguinity to the intestate, 
the more remote take per stirpes; but where all are 
in equal degrees in consanguinity, they take per 
capita. 
16 Am Jur. 806, lays down a similar principle: 
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Descendants, whether lineal or collateral of 
equal degree of kin to decedent take per capita and 
not per stirpes. 
Nieces and Nephews, sec. 35b, of 26 C.J.S. 1040: 
In cases where brothers and sisters are entitled 
to inherit, the children of a deceased brother or sis-
ter are entitled to take their parent's share; and, 
where no brothers and sis~ers sJ}rvive, nephews· and 
nieces take as the next of kin .... 
9. Wherever the principle -ol r~prese~tation is ap-
plied in our statute, 101-4-5, the general rule is adhered 
to: that the persons· entitled to take the estate share 
equally if they are in equal degree, and take by right of 
representation only where they are in unequal degree .. 
Thus, in subsection (1) : "remainder In equal 
shares to his children, and to the issue of any deceased 
child by right Qf representation." 
Again in _subsection ( 1) : "If all the descendants 
are in the same degree of kindred to the decedent, they 
share equally, otherwise they take by right of represen-
tation." 
In subsection (2): ''the estate goes In equal 
shares to the children living, or to the child living and 
the issue of the deceas.e.d child or children by right of 
representation." 
In subsection (3) : "in equal shares to the brothers 
and sisters of the decedent, and to the children or grand-
children of any deceased brother or sister by right of 
representation." 
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In subsection ( 4): "in equal shares to the bro.~h:~rs~ 
and sisters of the decedent, and to the children o~ gra,nd-
children of any deceased brother or sister by rig~t o~ 
r~presentation." · 
In subsection (6) : "the estate must go to the next 
of kin in equal shares." 
In subsection (7): "in equal shares to the other 
children of the same parent, an.d to the issue of any 
such other children who are dead, by right of represen-
tation." 
In subsection (8) : "lf all the issue are In the 
same degree of kindred to the child (Uncle), they share 
' .. - : " ; 
the estate equally, otherwise they take by right of rep· 
- ' - J , 
resentation." (This section we submit as pr~ctically 
controlling, in case at bar, to show the intent of the leg-
islature and the meaning of our statute as a whole.) 
In not a sing~e instance is the p;rincipl.e of ;rep;rese;n-
tation applied by any act or grant of s~ccessiop in o:u:r 
statute, when all the heirs are in equc;tl deg;ree of ~jndre«;; 
to the decedent. Only when t:here is an UJl.J~q:tJal :r:eJ(,lt~on 
is the representative principle applied; aAd t\1~~ .i~ tr.~e 
in the case of collateral heirs as well as in the cas;e of 
> -. • £ 
lineal descendants. 
10. There can be no question that where an am-
biguity or uncertainty has been created, rules of statu-
tary construction give the Court, nay, make it impera-
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tive and a matter of the court's duty, to interpret the 
statute fairly and according to its prior plain meaning, 
and to give effect to the gen~~al rules and principles of 
law gleaned from a reading of our statute as a whole. 
The ~Court should not be~caught upon a literal snag of an 
ambiguous negative phraseology inserted apart from its 
setting, meaning and the context of the entire statute. 
11. Three cases were cited by contestants to . the 
. ~ 
court below, in support of their position. All are dis-
tinguishable from case at bar. The first, in re Swenson's 
Estate, 160 N. W. 253, (Minn.), is different both as to 
the facts and the law. All of the heirs were not of equal 
degree, as a niece had died leaving children surviving her 
and .. rep:r:esenting her share. Thus the primary reason 
for making equal distribution, because the heirs are all 
of equal degree, did n9t exist in that case. The Minne-
sota statute was also very different from the Utah stat-
ute. To all lineal descendants the representative prin-
ciple was there strictly applied regardless of whether 
they were in equal degree or not. The Utah statute says 
they shall share equally if they be in _equal degree. The 
representative principle by the Minnesota statute was 
applied to all the "lawful issue of any brother or sister." 
Subsection ( 4) of the Utah statute applies it only to 
"children or grandchildren of any deceased-... brother or 
sister." Thus it is apparent at once that the intent and 
purpose of the Minnesota Legislature was to force all 
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lineal and collateral heirs to take by right of represen-
tation whether they were of equal degree or not. As we 
have pointed out the Utah statute in every instance, 
where the representative principle is applied, says that 
if the heirs be of equal degree they share equally, other-
wise they take by right of representation. We do not 
believe the negative phrase inserted in (6) has overcome 
this. 
In the second case, cited by contestants, Appeal of 
Messler, 127 A. 85, (N.J.) the statute was amended to 
expressly provide that children of deceased brothers and 
sisters should tak~ by right of representation, thus: 
... "Then equally among the parents . and 
brothers and sisters, and the representatives of de-
ceased brothers and sisters ; provided that no 
representation shall be admitted among collaterals 
after deceased brothers' and sisters' children." 
The Utah statute has no such provision. 
The third case, Hous.eley v. Laster, (Tenn.) 140 S.W. 
2d 146, was based on a similarly clear statute: "If no 
father or mother, or brothers and sisters, or the children 
if such brothers and sisters representing them, equally." 
Contestants would have a more plausible case if the Utah 
statute read as does the New Jersey or Tennessee stat-
ute. 
But the Utah statute reads different. The construe-
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tion contended for by respondents, -distribution to the 
heirs herein by representation rather than per capita, is, 
we S!Jhmit, not supported by our statute, 10-4·-5, as a 
whole. Nor can they claim such distribution (by repre-
sentation) under any specific section of our statute. 
The fact that the Code Committee attempted to classify 
them, (niece§ and nephews), as collateral heirs rather 
than as next of kin, is, we repeat, not sufficient, where 
no corresponding grant of succession is provided by stat-
ute. 
In addition to the foregoing, we wish to point out 
that in said three cases cited by respondent to the Court 
below as having changed the rule of -successi0.11 from per 
capita to the representative principle, succession to estate 
was in each case, correspondingly granted by the statute 
to the heirs in their new status and classification, to-wit: 
to collateral heirs. to take by representation, from their 
prior status as next of kin, who took equally on a per 
capita basis._ Thus in each of said three cases the stat-
ute had reclassified nieces and nephews from their 
status as next of kin to that of collater~l heirs, and the 
statutes, in each case, as the courts point out, was clear 
.. . .... 
and unequivocal not only as to classification, but also as 
to gran,t of succession of estate on a representative basis 
rather than on a per capita basis. 
In the case Re Swanson's Estate, the Minnesota 
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court recognized the rule that where the statutory 
amendment was ambiguous and the legislative intent un-
certain, and not clear, that the court would disregard the 
purported amendment and would carry out the prior 
statute, as was urged in that case. But the Minnesota 
court said: 
In the present case the law as revised is clear 
and unambiguous, and manifests a plain intent which 
will not permit us to hold that the Legisla-
ture intended to continue the former statute by 
which a surviving father took the whole estate to 
the entire exclusion of a surviving mother. Neither 
is there any rule which will permit us to disregard 
the new clause which the L.egislature inserted in 
subdivision 5 of the present Statute. The insertion 
of this clause leaves the statute clear and unambigu-
ous, and under such circumstances we cannot reject 
this clause nor declare it meaningless, but must give 
it the effect which the Legislature plainly intend-
ed. -
(Judgment affirmed") 
We have pointed out that just the opposite is true 
of the Utah Statute (6). By inserting the negative 
phrase "nor children or grandchildren of any deceased 
brother or sister," in (6) neices and nephews have been 
excluded from (6), and by failing to amend (4) so as to 
make that section apply, whether or not a brother or 
sister survives intestate, the heirs herein have literally 
been excluded as heirs of the intestate. 
Such a result could not have been intended by the 
legislature. Neither can it be argued that it was intend-
ed to change from next of kin to the representative 
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principle where, as here, all of the heirs are nieces and 
nephews in equal degree of consanguinity to intestate. 
Hence we come back to our main ·contention, that the 
confusion and uncertainty created· by the purported 
amendment to (6) compels the court to ignore it, and 
distribute the estate under { 6), with the negative phrase 
deleted, which will thus distribute the estate herein to 
the heirs (all nieces and nephews) equally. 
Deletion of Statute . . . However there are 
cases in which words of a statute are so meaning-
less, or inconsistent with the intention of the legis-
lature otherwise plainly expressed in the statute, 
that they may be rejected as surplusage and omit-
ted, eliminated or disregarded. 50 Am. Jur. Pg. 219. 
Extent and limitation of adherence to Foreign Con-
struction, 50 Am. Jur. pg. 473. 
The presumption and general rule th~t .. the 
adoption of a foreign statute carries with it the 
prior construction in the originating state is regard-
ed as of special force, and strong, persuasive, and 
is entitled to great weight, and respectful considera-
tion, so that only strong reason will warrant a de-
parture from it. 
Construction of Foreign Courts 
It is a general rule of law, in statutory con-
struction, that it is proper to resort to the decisions 
of courts of other states, construing statutory lan-
guage which is identical or of similar import. 50 
Am. J ur. pg. 315. (This applies particularly in the 
construction of ( 4). 
Indefiniteness and Uncertainty 
In the enactment of statutes reasonable pre-
cision is required. Indeed, one of the prime re-
quisites of any statute is certainty, and legislative 
enactments may be declared by the courts to be in-
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operative and void for uncertainty in the meaning 
thereof. This power may be exercised where the 
statute is so incomplete, or so irreconcilably con-
flicting, or so vague or indefinite, that the statute 
cannot be executed and the court is unable, by the 
application of known and accepted rules of con-
struction to determine what the legislature intend-
ed with any reasonable degree of certainty. 50 Am. 
J ur. Sec. 4 72, pg. 484. 
Ambiguity. The courts regard an ambiguity to 
exist where the legislature has enacted two or more pro-
visions which appear to be inconsistent. There is also 
authority for the rule that uncertainty as to the meaning 
of a statute, may arise from_ th~e fact that giving a liter-
al interpretation to the words that would lead to such 
unreasonable, unjust and impracticable or absurd conse-
quences, as to compel a conviction that they could not 
have been intended by the legislature. 
In conclusion, we submit that the construction con-
tended for by the administrator, and the distribution 
which follows fr_om such construction, is much more 
equitable and just. The estate herein came from an 
uncle to the heirs. It did not come from any brother or 
sister of intestate. Neither did any part of this estate 
ever pass to any predeceased brother or sister of dece-
dent. At no time did they have any power or control 
over any part of this estate. 
The heirs herein are all nieces and nephews. They 
are all equally related in the same degree of consanguin-
ity to decedent; who apparently had no favorites, for he 
left no will. These njeces an nephews were apparently 
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all equally near and dear to the intestate; and in as 
much as they were all equally related to him, we respect-
fully submit, not only from the law and the statutes 
which we have argued (and the analogy to be drawn 
from sub-sections (1) and (8), but also as a matter of 
justice and equity and fair play, this estate should be 
distributed to the heirs herein equally, as his next of kin. 
More controlling still is the fact that (6), as now 
amended by the Code Committee, makes the statute 
vague, ambiguous and accomplishes such unjust results 
by penalizing· the heirs of. decedent who come from large 
families, but who are equally related to intestate, that 
this court should refuse to accept the interpretation con-
tended for by respondents. 
50 Am .. Jur. page 372. E. Avoidance of Undesir-
able Consequences. 
No. 368. Generally. The results which will 
follow one construction or another of a statute is of-
ten a potent factor in its interpretation. Frequent-
ly, the undesirable or mischievous consequences of a 
different construction are used by the courts to in-
dicate the correctness of the interpretation adopted 
by them by the application o:f_ other rules of con-
struction. Similarly, courts sometimes take the 
time and space to refute the undesirable consequence 
claimed to attach to a statute under an interpreta-
tion of it favored by the courts. Indeed, there are 
cases in which the consequences of a particular 
construction are, in and of themselves conclusive as 
to the correct solution of the question. In any 
event, it is generally regarded as permissable to con-
sider the consequences of a proposed interpretation 
of a statute, where the act is ambiguous in terms 
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and fairly susceptible of two constructions. Where 
the language of a statute is doubtful and the neces-
sity for construction arises, the court may consider 
whether the legislature could have intended a con-
struction that would be highly injurious, rather 
than one beneficial and harmless . . . 
Where the literal construction of an act will 
produce results so extraordinary that they cannot 
be deemed to have been within the legislative in-
tent, the general language of the act may be restric-
ted so as to accomplish the general intent and pur-
pose of the act. In this respect, there is authority 
for the rule that uncertainty as to the meaning of a 
statute may arise from the fact that giving a liter-
al interpretation to the words would lead to such 
undesirable consequences as to compel a conviction 
that they could not have been intended by the legis-
lature. 
369. Inequitable Results. The law is pre-
sumed to be equitable, and it is a reasonable and 
safe rule of construction to resolve any ambiguity 
in a statute in favor of an equitable operation of the 
law. However, where the statute is una111biguous, 
the consideration whether the provisions of the stat-
ute are strictly equitable or otherwise, should not 
influence the court in determining the effect there-
of. The courts may not give to a statute a meaning 
to which its language is not susceptible, merely to 
avoid what the court believes are inequitable results. 
The fact that the effect of the statute as applied to 
a particular case may be inequitable does not make 
it absurd so as to justify a departure from its plain 
meaning. 
370. Injustice or Unfairness. In the con-
structiop. of a statute, consideration of what causes 
injustice may have potent influence. It is not to be 
supposed that the framers of a statute contemplated 
a violation of rules of natural justice, and it should 
not be presumed to have been within the legislative 
intent to enact a law having an unjust result. To 
the contrary, it is to be presumed that the legisla-
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ture intended the law not to work an injustice. Ac-
cordingly, it is a general rule that where a statute 
is ambiguous in terms and fairly susceptible of two 
constructons, the injustice which may follow one 
construction or the other may properly he consider-
ed, and the courts, to support their construction of 
a statute, frequently refer to the justice thereof, or 
to the injustice which would result from a different 
construction of the law. Indeed, it is the duty of 
courts to render such an interpretation of the laws 
as will best subserve the ends of justice, in so far 
as this may be accomplished in accordance with well 
established rules of statutory construction, and it is 
considered a reasonable and safe rule of construc-
tion to resolve any ambiguity in a statute in favor 
of a just or fair interpretation thereof, or in favor 
of such an interpretation as would promote and ef-
fectuate justice, and result in a fair application of 
the statute. A construction should be avoided which 
renders the statute unfair or unjust in its operation, 
where the language of the statute does not compel 
such a result. The terms employed by the legisla-
ture are not to receive an)nterpretation which con-
flicts with acknowledged principles of justice if an-
other sense, consonant with those principles, can be 
giv~n to them. Moreover, the fact that unjust re-
sults follow the literal application of the language 
of a statute justifies a search of the statute for 
further indications of _legislative intent. On the 
ground that a techincality should not be permitted 
to override justice, the general intention of the leg-
islature is generally held to control the strict Jetter 
of the statute where an adherence to the strict let-
ter would lead to injustice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEON F'ONNE:SBECK, 
Attorney For Appellant 
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